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Reconciliation in Later Classical and Post-Classical Greek Cities: a Question of Peace and Peacefulness?

Benjamin Gray

1. Introduction¹

This chapter addresses the question: at what type of social relations among fellow citizens should a process of reconciliation aim? In other words, what is the opposite state to hateful civil strife (*stasis* in Greek)? Is that desirable state best conceptualised and described as stability? Or, on the contrary, should it be treated as a state of dynamism, movement and flexibility, the literal opposite of *stasis*? Moreover, should that desirable opposite of *stasis* be regarded principally as a state of harmony and unity of purpose, or rather as one of peace and non-violence?

The chapter's focus is the wide range of approaches adopted by Greek cities, from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the early Roman Empire, to the problem of resolving and overcoming *stasis*. It concentrates on Greek ideas concerning reconciliation, including the ways in which they were embedded in institutions and practices. The institutional, legal and ideological aspects of civic reconciliation in Greek poleis have been intensively studied by modern scholars.² This chapter seeks to bring a new dimension to these debates, by approaching ancient Greek reconciliation through the questions raised above. Accordingly, it compares Greek approaches to reconciliation within a city and to peace among separate states: it discusses how far Greeks' conceptions of internal civic reconciliation resembled their conceptions of interstate peace, order and harmony,³ and how far the two diverged. What role did virtues of peacefulness and restraint play in the two contexts?

A picture emerges of complex Greek debates about the best ways to achieve reconciliation among fellow citizens, tied to differing and developing ideas about how best to achieve non-violent co-operation across separate states. These ancient debates underwent significant changes across the period discussed. In particular, in the period when the Romans came to dominate the Greek world, from the second century BC onwards, many Greeks developed complex new approaches both to internal civic solidarity and to interstate peace, which reduced the distance between the two: they emphasised a peaceful, gentle, tolerant model of social relations, applicable both within and beyond civic frontiers. These new ideas about peace, peacefulness and reconciliation in the later Hellenistic world and early Roman Empire are of particularly direct relevance for modern debates about how to sustain both citizenship and peace in a cosmopolitan, mobile, unequal world.

2. Two Analogous Pairs: *Polemos* and *Eirene*, *Stasis* and *Homonoia*

Around the time of the Peloponnesian War, the Classical Greeks developed a powerful and influential pair of conceptual oppositions for capturing different types of conflict, and different types of peace. On the one hand, there is war between different states or communities: *polemos*. The opposite of *polemos* is *eirene*, peace: the absence of war, but perhaps also sometimes something more substantial, involving at least some mutual

¹ I am very grateful to Eoghan Moloney and Michael Williams for their help with this paper. For epigraphic abbreviations, see the *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*.

² See, for example, Asheri (1969), (1982); Lonis (1991); Loraux (2001), (2005); Dössel (2003); Shear (2011); Carawan (2013); Gray (2013b), (2015), chs. 1–2; Boulay (2014), Part III, ch. 3. On *stasis* itself, see especially Gehrke (1985).

³ On the latter, see recently Low (2007); Mack (2015), with much further bibliography.

benevolence and tolerance on the part of the previously or potentially warring parties. On the other hand, there is conflict and (civil) war within a single polis or community: *stasis*. The opposite of *stasis* is not straightforward peace, but something more complex and substantial: *homonoia* (concord or ‘one-mindedness’).

The use of the word *homonoia* to describe peace, reconciliation and order after civil conflict had not fully taken hold in the closing decades of the fifth century BC. Euripides, in a fragment of his *Kresphontes*, makes his chorus appeal to the personified goddess of peace, Eirene, as the saviour of the polis of Messene from internal strife (described as both *stasis* and *eris*).⁴ On the other hand, even in the later fifth century, *eirene* was overwhelmingly used to describe interstate, rather than internal, peace. This is Thucydides’ consistent practice. In his famous discussion of *stasis* in Corcyra, for example, he makes reference to *polemos* and *eirene* in order to identify them as external conditions which determine the political, social and ethical condition of a polis.⁵

By the early fourth century, as Lysias’ speeches attest, the crucial verbal distinctions were becoming established in Athenian civic rhetoric.⁶ Later in the fourth century, the authors of the central works of fourth-century Athenian political philosophy treated it as generally recognised that *homonoia* is the opposite of *stasis*.⁷ The conceptual opposition between *homonoia* and *stasis* also remained vibrant into the Hellenistic period and beyond, featuring, for example, in Polybius’ account of early Sparta.⁸

The championing of *homonoia* as the ideal, harmonious state of civic life, the opposite of strife, also features prominently in civic inscriptions and cult of the fourth century, Hellenistic period and early Imperial period.⁹ Particularly relevant are the numerous inscriptions of those periods which directly address issues of *stasis* and reconciliation. Relevant inscriptions attest the measures taken by poleis to reconcile their citizens after *stasis*, or to quell incipient conflict before it developed into full *stasis*.¹⁰ Some of the relevant surviving inscriptions give detailed presentations of wide-ranging reconciliation settlements after full-scale *stasis*.

Most such inscriptions attest the involvement of a panel of arbitrators or judges. From the later fourth century onwards these arbitrators and judges were often brought in from abroad: they were individuals chosen, in theory at least, for their transparent impartiality. Such foreign judges and arbitrators are also central to the second, more numerous category of relevant documents: cities’ honorific decrees praising those arbitrators’ and judges’ virtues and justice. Most of those praised were charged with resolving intractable disputes within cities in moments of high tension,¹¹ usually before full *stasis* broke out, but sometimes afterwards; disputes related to debt were commonly central.¹² The crucial conceptual opposition was made explicit in a second-century BC example from the polis of Phalanna in Thessaly, in which a foreign judge was praised for reconciling all the citizens without giving cause for complaint; removing *stasis*, he restored the citizens to *homonoia* (διέλυσεν πάντας

⁴ Euripides fr. 453 Nauck.

⁵ Thucydides 3.82.1–2.

⁶ See Lysias 25.30; cf. 18.17.

⁷ See Plato *Republic* 351d4–6; Xenophon *Memorabilia* 4.6.14; Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a24–6.

⁸ Polybius 6.4.6–7.

⁹ Thériault (1996), esp. ch. 1.

¹⁰ For analysis of the full range of relevant texts, see Dössel (2003).

¹¹ On the summoning of foreign judges as a response to crisis, see Crowther (1995).

¹² On Greek approaches to resolving debt disputes, see Asheri (1969).

ἀνεγκλήτως καὶ σ[τά]σιν ἀνελών εἰς ὁμόνοια[ν κα]τή[γαγ]εν).¹³ This pair of opposing concepts also features in an inscription of another type, from the first century AD, which casts light on concepts of peace, reconciliation and civil war: the inscription recording the arrangements for the creation of a new Roman province in Lycia in the mid-first century AD. In that text, recent disturbances in Lycia are described as *stasis*, lawlessness (*anomia*) and ‘pillaging’ (*leisteiai*); they have now been superseded by *homonoia*, together with the rule of law.¹⁴

The parallel with the other pair, *eirene* and *polemos*, also remained a well-established way of conceptualising different types of conflict and peace. The second-century AD orator Aelius Aristides, in his speech to the Rhodians on *homonoia* itself, argues against the view that *stasis* is as much worse than *polemos* as *polemos* itself is worse than *eirene*; *polemos* is sometimes preferable to *eirene*, but *stasis* is never preferable to *homonoia*.¹⁵ The sense that *eirene* is a matter of relations among larger, more dispersed groups, whereas *homonoia* is what is appropriate at the level of the city, is evident in the work of the early Imperial Stoic philosopher Epictetus. He comments that, if each individual takes care of his own will or *prohairesis*, as the only thing of real importance for his own well-being, that situation makes for *philia* in the household, *homonoia* in the polis, and *eirene* in or among (larger) ethnic groups (*ethne*).¹⁶ These three levels of social interaction could thus strike a Greek thinker as demanding very different types of relationship and solidarity, perhaps more so than they would many modern observers.

3. *Homonoia* as a Special Type of Reconciliation and Peace, Particularly Complex and Intense

The linguistic tendencies discussed in the previous section had deep social and ideological roots. The predilection of the later Classical and Hellenistic Greeks for the word *homonoia* as the best way of describing true, durable civic reconciliation was an expression of a fundamental, widespread approach to restoring civic order after *stasis*. According to this approach, in order to achieve true civic peace, it is not sufficient merely to bring conflicting individuals to tolerate one another, and to coexist in the same place without antagonism. Rather, it is necessary to incorporate them all, as citizens, within a civic community, governed by an ordered political structure or *politeia*, itself grounded in political and ethical standards of justice and local cultural values. The result should be both highly complex and highly integrated. This approach involves complex procedures and processes of reconciliation (*dialysis*, *diallagai*), leading eventually to *homonoia*.

Aristotle captures this widespread Greek aspiration very well, in his comment that lawgivers aim most of all at friendship and *homonoia*, in order to drive out *stasis*. The civic friendship he has in mind is a very intense type: it can even make strict justice superfluous,¹⁷ because the friendly citizens trust and understand one another so well. It is also necessarily structured by the laws and constitution (*politeia*) which Aristotle thinks a prerequisite of any true civic community.¹⁸

¹³ IG IX 2 1230, ll. 11–13.

¹⁴ SEG 51.1832, a, ll. 16–24.

¹⁵ Aelius Aristides, *To the Rhodians, On Concord*, p. 562, ll. 15–19.

¹⁶ Epictetus *Discourses* 4.5.35.

¹⁷ Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1155a23–8.

¹⁸ Aristotle *Politics* 1276b1–2. On Aristotle’s ideas, compare Desmond, this volume, ch. 2.

The same aspiration to a special, complex type of integration among citizens is also evident in the different types of Greek inscription concerned with overcoming or pre-empting *stasis*, introduced in the previous section. Greek civic reconciliation settlements were usually designed to rebuild a complex, integrated polis, governed by law and a constitution and united through shared values and traditions. This is particularly evident from the content of the oaths which such settlements often required some or all citizens to swear.¹⁹ One such oath is recorded in a recently discovered fourth-century BC reconciliation settlement after *stasis* from Dikaia (Chalkidike).²⁰ Through that oath, the reconciled Dikaiopolitan citizens promised to participate in, and defend, a complex political and social system in their polis, held together by ties of reciprocity, tradition, religion and good faith. They explicitly committed themselves both to abstract justice and to their ancestral constitution (*politeia*), embracing both as structuring principles of their civic life.²¹

This oath was in keeping with a broader Greek tendency to make shared commitment to the rule of law and the *politeia* a central, explicit feature of civic reconciliation.²² It was usually made explicit, as at Dikaia, that citizens were joining together in loyalty to a previous constitution, the ‘ancestral constitution’, strongly supported by tradition; this was also a centrepiece of the famous Athenian amnesty and reconciliation of 403 BC, after the rule of the Thirty Tyrants.²³ Such rhetorical stress on tradition did not necessarily prevent revisions of laws and procedures in a way deemed appropriate by both sides, which occurred at Athens after the oligarchies of 411 and 403.²⁴

In addition to oaths and attention to the *politeia*, Greek reconciliation settlements also made use of other institutions, rituals and rhetoric designed for building complex, integrated civic communities. It was also common to make use of religious rituals for this purpose. One of the most striking such rituals is the ‘brother-making’ attested in a reconciliation settlement from Nakone in Western Sicily in the fourth or third century BC: new artificial ‘brotherhoods’ of five citizens were to be formed, each containing one member of each of the factions in the recent *stasis* and three neutral citizens. These brotherhoods were then to take part in an annual festival, partly dedicated to Homonoia herself.²⁵ In other cases, rituals of reconciliation could take the more conventional form of a collective sacrifice, procession or prayer.²⁶

As well as seeking to rebuild trust and order through oaths, rituals and reinforcement of the *politeia*, those charged with devising durable terms of reconciliation also sought to tackle the more mundane, specific and intricate practical problems presented by a post-*stasis* situation. Prominent among these problems were property disputes²⁷ and issues of retrospective justice

¹⁹ On oaths of reconciliation, see recently Sommerstein, Bayliss et al. (2013), 129–44.

²⁰ *SEG* 57.576 (Dikaia, 365–59 BC), ll. 67–84.

²¹ Compare Gray (2013b).

²² Compare, for example, the oath restoring civic order at Hellenistic Itanos, which includes varied pledges to abstain from revolutionary behaviour: *IC* III iv 8, ll. 9–38.

²³ On this amnesty, see in detail Edwards, this volume, ch. 15.

²⁴ See Dössel (2003), 55–146; Shear (2011), chs. 3 and 8; Carawan (2013), all citing earlier bibliography. For constitutional reforms in other parts of the Greek world, often designed to resolve conflicts, see Bencivenni (2003).

²⁵ See *SEG* 30.1119, with *SEG* 51.1185, analysed in Asheri (1982); Ampolo (2001); Loraux (2001), esp. 215–28; Dössel (2003), 235–47.

²⁶ See, for example, Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 85A and B, ll. 39–49.

²⁷ See especially Lonis (1991).

and amnesty.²⁸ Such practical measures too were an integral part of the project of rebuilding a complex, carefully balanced interlocking structure of political institutions and relationships. As I have argued in detail elsewhere, responses to such practical problems could help to articulate distinctive ideological visions of the best form of civic order: more community-centred or more contractual.²⁹ Most commonly, these different approaches were combined and blended together, as those charged with reconciliation sought to achieve a delicate and complex balance between strict justice, the rule of law, institutional functioning, solidarity, the common good, and the flexibility which comes through arbitration, amnesty and compromise.³⁰

It is possible to draw out from this discussion several specific respects in which this type of civic reconciliation was commonly regarded as something distinct from basic peace, of the type which might regularly be achieved among separate, self-interested poleis or other states. First, *homonoia* intrinsically required a much greater level of consensus: ‘one-mindedness’ demanded a coalescence in views about fundamental issues such as legitimate law, political interests and ethical values, even if it allowed considerable disagreement concerning more specific issues and preferences.³¹ That is to say, *homonoia* was an intrinsically political state, requiring collective endorsement of, and interaction within, a sophisticated framework of both institutions and ideals, especially ideals of justice, citizenship and equality.

This point can be explored with the aid of a distinction drawn by F. Wendt between different conceptions of peace prominent among modern political theorists: first, ‘ordinary peace’, a form of ‘non-violent coexistence based on *modus vivendi* arrangements’; second, ‘ambitious peace’, a type of peace ‘beyond compromise’, which involves a much greater level of mutual understanding and consensus, at least concerning ‘second-order’, foundational issues concerning law, politics and often also morality and the good life.³² *Homonoia*, as an ideal, was much closer to the latter, more ambitious type: it involved substantial solidarity and unity among citizens. Interstate peace, by contrast, could easily be considered by ancient Greeks justifiably limited to a *modus vivendi* compromise, for the sake of stability, among separate states which retained very different interests and outlooks.

This is not to deny a point which also emerges elsewhere in this volume: the Greek word most commonly used to describe interstate peace, *eirene*, could also, in certain contexts, itself take on a far more substantial, even utopian form in Greek thinking and practice, inching towards ‘ambitious peace’.³³ This is all particularly well attested for the fourth century BC. For example, the fourth-century notion of a widespread or ‘common peace’, *koine eirene*, across the Greek world and beyond, by which all signatories renounced violence against one another, could be embraced in the highly idealistic spirit of an aspiration to peaceful unity across frontiers, of the kind richly attested in Isocrates’ speeches.³⁴ Furthermore, a fourth-century ‘common peace’ was also based, in practice, on a complex formal structure of oaths and guarantees.³⁵

²⁸ See, for example, Carawan (2013); Edwards, this volume, ch. 15.

²⁹ See Gray (2013b) and (2015), chs. 1–2.

³⁰ Compare Crowther (1995), 92; Roebuck (2001), 24–5, 282; Dössel (2003), 256, 262.

³¹ Compare Xenophon *Memorabilia* 4.4.16.

³² Wendt (2013).

³³ On the complex range of Greek and Roman approaches to peace, see Raaflaub (2007), with earlier bibliography.

³⁴ See especially Isocrates 8 (*On the Peace*), e.g. 8.16, 21.

³⁵ On *koine eirene*, see Ryder (1965); Jehne (1994).

Eirene was also worshipped in Greek cities as a goddess: it was something far more complex, admirable and desirable than mere makeshift compromise. There was a fourth-century statue of Eirene in the Athenian agora, portrayed cradling wealth.³⁶ Though this was probably not principally a sign of ‘nascent pacifism’, but rather a celebration of the role of recent peace agreements in humbling Sparta and enriching Athens,³⁷ its existence does suggest that the fourth-century Athenians regarded interstate peace as worthy of celebration in itself. Something closer to a form of pacifism may be evident in the later fourth-century cult at Athens of Eirene, which could be documented in official records alongside sacrifices to *Demokratia* herself:³⁸ internal democratic order should ideally be accompanied by a stable, prosperous state of peace across the wider Greek world.³⁹

Nonetheless, though it could be an ideal in itself, it is doubtful that Greeks often conceived *eirene* as involving anything like the level of integration and shared purpose characteristic of *homonoia*: *eirene*’s core associations were with non-violent coexistence. Moreover, even if some Greek peace agreements were complex and idealistic, Greek peaces did not tend to have the level of institutional complexity commonly found in civic reconciliation agreements: they did not unify the signatories as consensual supporters of a single complex *politeia* or world-view. As Chaniotis argues, Hellenistic Greeks of the third and earlier second centuries BC may well even have rowed back from the more idealistic and rich notions of interstate peace prominent in the fourth century BC, in favour of a more contractual and pragmatic notion of interstate peace as a cessation of hostilities between particular parties; new cults and statues of Eirene are not well-attested for the Hellenistic world.⁴⁰

This leads onto the second major reason why the later Classical and Hellenistic Greeks tended to distinguish internal civic reconciliation from interstate peace: *homonoia* within a polis demanded a set of emotions, attitudes and dispositions which were distinct from those characteristic of ‘ordinary’ peace, whose participants usually remain quite detached from one another. In a state of basic, relatively undemanding peace, participants’ attitudes tend towards the calm, gentle, mild and uninvested: ordinary peace is a state of mutual tolerance or, at most, gentle, relatively detached benevolence. It is also a state of disarmament, literal and metaphorical. In a fully reconciled and unified Greek polis, by contrast, citizens were commonly expected to show patriotic fervour, as well as zeal to protect the city’s constitution and freedom: consider, for example, the Dikaiopolitan oath, discussed above. They might also be expected to show spirited, emotional, brotherly solidarity, as in the Nakone brother-making.⁴¹

These heightened, focussed attitudes encouraged, or demanded, something quite different from mere physical and moral disarmament in relations between fellow citizens. Moreover, they militated against disarmament of any kind in relations with outsiders: internal solidarity was often even dependent on military patriotism and scepticism, if not outright hostility, towards outsiders. Indeed, in the Dikaiopolitan oath, all citizens had to swear not to admit any foreigners (*xenoi*, perhaps mercenaries) into the city to the detriment of the community. In an even more emphatic case, a third-century oath of *homonoia* from Chersonesos Taurica on the

³⁶ Pausanias 1.8.2; 9.16.2.

³⁷ Parker (1996), 229–30, quoted in Raaflaub (2007), 14.

³⁸ *IG* II² 1496, ll. 126–36, concerning 332/1 BC.

³⁹ Compare Isocrates 8.20.

⁴⁰ Chaniotis (2005), 184–5, 252–3.

⁴¹ On the emotional dimension of civic reconciliation: Chaniotis (2010).

Black Sea explicitly committed all citizens not to collaborate with external forces of any kind, in order to preserve the safety and freedom of the city:

I will participate in concord (*homonoia*) concerning the salvation (*soteria*) and freedom (*eleutheria*) of the polis and the citizens, and I will not betray Chersonesos or Kerkinitis or Kalos Limen or the other fortifications or the other territories which the citizens of Chersonesos enjoy or enjoyed to anyone, either Greek or barbarian....⁴²

This oath of *homonoia* from Chersonesos Taurica may well have been a factional oath, binding together one political grouping against another gathered in strongholds nearby.⁴³ Nonetheless, this oath indicates well how intense internal cohesiveness could go hand in hand with heightened scepticism towards the outside world; passionate solidarity did not readily coalesce with easy-going tolerance, or eirenic serenity. To put it another way, achieving *homonoia* was not normally a question of superseding or curbing aggression, but rather of channelling it into acceptable, patriotic civic forms.

This is closely related to the third major difference between full, internal reconciliation and ‘ordinary’ peace. Ordinary peace can be extended across a very wide population and area, potentially the whole world or Greek world: for example, a Greek ‘common peace’ was, by its very nature, very wide-ranging. By contrast, internal *homonoia* was best suited by far to a smaller, more particularist and often exclusive community, whose members could achieve, or aspire to, the political consensus and emotional solidarity explored above.

The argument of this section should not, however, be taken to imply that there were sharp barriers in general between Greek approaches to internal civic and interstate relationships. On the contrary, there was great interpenetration of concepts, vocabulary and institutions between the two spheres.⁴⁴ The institutions and procedures for building interstate peaces, alliances and stronger bonds were often very close in character to those found in reconciliation agreements.

The similarities are understandably particularly strong in the case of settlements uniting two cities together in a special close bond, or even as one new city, through *isopoliteia* or *sympoliteia* or similar arrangements.⁴⁵ This is an explicable overlap: in both cases, the aim was to unify within a single political system divergent groups which had, at least until recently, pursued different or even conflicting aims and loyalties. One striking case of a union between poleis, the so-called *homopoliteia* of Cos and Kalymna in the later third-century BC, immediately evokes by its name the ideal of *homonoia* within a single polis. The oath included in that union also closely resembles the oaths of civic reconciliation discussed above: it includes promises to respect the constitution; to avoid deceit and treachery; to act fairly in legal and political life; and to enhance the strength and power of the new, expanded polis.⁴⁶

⁴² *IosPE* I² 401, ll. 5–12.

⁴³ Dössel (2003), 187–90.

⁴⁴ This is a prominent theme of Low (2007); Mack (2015).

⁴⁵ On such unions between cities, see now, in general, Mack (2014), citing much earlier bibliography.

⁴⁶ See *IG* XII 4 1 152; for a partially very similar, partially quite different Hellenistic internal civic reconciliation, brokered by Coan arbitrators in the small island polis of Telos, see *IG* XII 4 1 132.

Nevertheless, civic reconciliation settlements could also be echoed in the formulation of weaker, less full-blooded interstate agreements and bonds, not least in oaths, pledges and requirements to renounce and abstain from treachery, deceit and collaboration with enemies, in favour of loyalty to allies and to agreements.⁴⁷ Such pledges could even feature in agreements to respect and enforce interstate peace, such as the oath sworn by the members of the League of Corinth, formed after the victories of Philip of Macedon over much of the Greek world in the early 330s BC: that oath required participants to respect the peace and agreements, to abstain from aggression against one another, and to respect existing political arrangements in participating states.⁴⁸

At the level of ideology and concepts, it was probably easiest and most common for ideas and vocabulary from the sphere of domestic and civic relations to be transferred and adapted to suit interstate relations. For example, the notion of friendship (*philia*) was very often applied, more or less metaphorically, to cordial relations between Greek states in alliance with each other. In a less ubiquitous example, agreements restoring non-hostile bonds between states could be described as *dialysis*⁴⁹ or *diallagai*.⁵⁰ *Homonoia*, too, was quite commonly applied to interstate relations, though it was usually chosen with a specific intention to emphasise the richness, strength and closeness of the relevant bonds. As Thériault shows, *homonoia* seems first to have been applied to interstate relations by Isocrates in the fourth century BC, as a way of capturing the ideal of unblemished Greek solidarity, in opposition to the barbarians. The theme of very widespread, multilateral *homonoia* is seldom attested for the Hellenistic period, though it surfaces in the rhetoric of the Chremonidean War, but it returns to prominence in Greek conceptualisations of the Roman Empire.⁵¹ From the third century BC onwards, and especially in the Roman Empire, *homonoia* was also increasingly used to describe warm, close bilateral relationships between Greek cities, often but not always relationships which had been restored after strife.⁵² The developments following the Roman conquest were part of a wider blurring of distinctions between internal civic and interstate relations, explored in section 4 below.

Migration of concepts and vocabulary in the other direction is not as noticeable, at least for the fourth century and early Hellenistic period (contrast the next section, on later Hellenistic developments). This is probably partly because interstate relations were themselves so often couched in terms familiar from internal civic relations in the first place. Nonetheless, terms which did have a distinctive association with interstate relations were not necessarily always easy to apply to internal civic relations.

In particular, it seems to have been relatively rare for Classical and early Hellenistic Greeks to conceptualise fully developed internal civic peace and reconciliation as *eirene*. The most significant evidence for this claim is the fact that *eirene* scarcely features in the quite copious surviving evidence for the epigraphy of civic reconciliation discussed in this section. Since these inscribed texts were the products of wide-ranging, usually inclusive political processes,

⁴⁷ For a rich selection of agreements between poleis containing mutual assurances and protections, see the Hellenistic Cretan examples collected in Chaniotis (1996), e.g. no. 6, ll. 46–60; no. 26, ll. 13–25. Similar pledges would probably have featured, for example, in the oaths which cemented Athens' alliances in its fourth-century Second Athenian Confederacy: for confirmation that such oaths were sworn, see Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 23 (concerning Methymna), ll. 11–19.

⁴⁸ See Rhodes-Osborne, *GHI* 76, esp. ll. 4–17.

⁴⁹ E.g. Thucydides 4.19.1.

⁵⁰ E.g. Lycophron *Alexandra*, ll. 1447–8.

⁵¹ Thériault (1996), 102–111.

⁵² Thériault (1996), ch. 2.

and designed for wide consumption and application, they provide the best available evidence for ancient Greeks' instinctive ideas and word-choices. It is significant that they seem generally to have steered away from the possible option of treating developed, durable interstate reconciliation, involving sustainable non-violent stability, as a form of *eirene* in official documents. There were, however, notable exceptions and changes in the later Hellenistic period and early Roman Empire; this is the concern of the next section.⁵³

In literary sources of the fourth century and early Hellenistic period, there are some uses of *eirene* to describe internal civic reconciliation, but this seems to have been quite rare. Some attested cases are themselves revealing, and confirm the wider Greek tendency to differentiate civic from interstate peace. Xenophon uses the word *eirene* to describe the initial ceasefire between the Athenian factions which eventually led to the reconciliation of 403 BC. However, this is clearly not yet a full reconciliation: immediately afterwards in Xenophon's account, unreconciled oligarchs form their own enclave, with the acquiescence of their opponents, in Eleusis. A complex combination of speeches and legal processes eventually leads to a more substantial civic reconciliation, including the famous amnesty. Xenophon describes that more intense and integrated form of reconciliation in different terms: ever since this point, the Athenians have been conducting their civic life 'together' (ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὁμοῦ ... πολιτεύονται).⁵⁴ Initial *eirene* is thus superseded by something much more substantial, closer to *homonoia*.

Plato, for his part, self-consciously plays with the common Greek distinctions between *stasis* and *polemos*, *homonoia* and *eirene*. From Plato's critical perspective, these distinctions are misleading. The Greeks claim that their interstate wars are something more acceptable and glorious than *stasis*, but they are in fact tragic internecine struggles, which hinder true Greek unity. Conversely, it is wrong to separate out internal *stasis* as a distinct type of conflict, when all forms of armed struggle among Greeks should be analysed and condemned together.⁵⁵ This is made clear in the *Laws*, where Plato's Athenian speaker describes armed struggle within a polis as 'so-called *stasis*': it is, in fact, simply a particularly acute and brutal form of war, *polemos*. This rhetorical strategy explains why the Athenian speaker at the same time describes internal civic reconciliation, not only as friendship (*philia*), but also as peace (*eirene*):⁵⁶ he has a special interest in challenging and playing down distinctions between civic and interstate relationships and conflicts. Plato's approach shows that the entrenched distinctions between *homonoia* and *eirene*, and between inside and outside the polis, were open to question and revision, in ways which became more intense in the later Hellenistic period. This is the focus of the next section.

4. A Later Hellenistic and Early Imperial Alternative Approach to Reconciliation and Civic Order, and their Relationship with Peace

The approaches and distinctions discussed in the previous two sections certainly endured with strength into the later Hellenistic and Roman Imperial periods (after c. 150 BC).⁵⁷ In those

⁵³ An earlier possible epigraphic exception is the decree of the Athenian deme of Aixone praising Demetrius of Phaleron for his role in reunifying the Athenian polis after unrest involving both external intervention and internal discord (*IG II² 1201*, ll. 9–10); but this possible reference to *eirene* is very uncertain, because it is part of a modern restoration of very fragmentary lines.

⁵⁴ Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.4.38–43.

⁵⁵ Compare Manicas (1982), esp. 687–8.

⁵⁶ Plato *Laws* 628a9–d1. For a similar blurring of the boundaries between *polemos* and *stasis*, in a way which associates internal stability closely with *eirene*, compare the herald Kleokritos at Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.4.21–2.

⁵⁷ For the continuing importance of interstate war for the Hellenistic cities, which often preserved their own citizen-armies, see Ma (2000a); Boulay (2014).

periods, however, some Greek thinkers and citizens came to give new prominence to an alternative model of civic relationships suitable for putting an end to, or pre-empting, *stasis*. According to this view, civic order and reconciliation should not be based solely or even principally on hard-headed, rationalistic justice, consensual institutions, mutual aid and shared commitment to the common good. This is because order and reconciliation should not be a matter solely of citizens rationally and soberly making judgements about personal and collective interests and values, in a way leading to self-control and the kind of considered consensus which the literal association of *homonoia* with concord among minds seems to require.⁵⁸ Rather, according to this alternative view, a very considerable role in civic order and political reconciliation should also be played by gentler virtues and emotions, based on friendliness and tolerance: decency (*epieikeia*), mildness (*praotes*), tameness or civilisation (*hemerotes*) and humanity (*philanthropia*).⁵⁹ These were more obviously and intrinsically states of disarmament: they involved relaxation of hard-headed aggression, suspicion, scepticism and calculation, and of the more stern and austere aspects of self-control.

The roots of this approach are evident in the explanation given by Polybius in the second century BC for the stability of the communities of his home region of Arcadia in the Peloponnese, to which the acute *staseis* suffered by the city of Kynaitha were a glaring exception. Polybius argues that the citizens of Kynaitha had neglected key features of a good and stable polis, but the features on which he concentrates are not justice, sobriety, rational debate or intense emotional solidarity around shared ideals of the common good. Rather, he offers the distinctive argument that the people of Kynaitha had disregarded traditional Arcadian music and dance, which usually served to soften hard-bitten Arcadian souls, made severe by hard work in the fields. Order, stability and co-operation can be durably achieved within an Arcadian polis only, Polybius suggests, if citizens are encouraged towards mild and gentle forms of solidarity and mutual concern. These milder virtues are more a matter of fellow-feeling and sympathy, which can potentially be extended to all human beings, than of solidarity with an exclusive group. Indeed, Polybius opens the whole section by saying that the Arcadians are famous for both their humanity or ‘love of humanity’ (*philanthropia*) and their love of foreigners (*philoxenia*).⁶⁰

Polybius’ interest in humanity (*philanthropia*), a mild and gentle virtue which can potentially be applied to all fellow humans, is paralleled in the approach to *stasis* and its avoidance adopted by the first-century BC historian Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus does, though, invest this approach with a notably paternalistic, or even elitist, aspect. While discussing the first Sicilian ‘Slave War’, Diodorus makes some general comments about the best ways to maintain peace and harmony within a household or city. According to Diodorus, elite citizens within a city, like good heads of households, should treat their inferiors, both citizens and their slaves, with paternalistic kindness (*philanthropia*, *epieikeia* and *praotes*). This is the best way to avoid the revolts and *stasis* which arise when inferiors feel that they are treated without mildness (ἀννημέπως).⁶¹

This approach remained prominent in the early Imperial period. Plutarch, for example, developed a political ideal of gentle, hierarchical solidarity among citizens, in which

⁵⁸ For the prominent Greek tendency to associate civic order with good *judgement* by citizens, and *stasis* with its lack, compare, for example, Thucydides 3.82–3.

⁵⁹ For the increasing prominence of gentler, more humane ideals in Greek culture more generally in this period, compare Konstan (2001).

⁶⁰ See Polybius 4.17–21. Compare Gray (2013a), 160–2.

⁶¹ Diodorus 34/35.2.33; Gray (2013a), 159–60.

philanthropia and related virtues play a prominent part.⁶² In his work on *How a Republic should be Governed*, as in his work on *Whether an Old Man should Participate in Politics*, Plutarch develops a picture of the good citizen and leader as moderate and humane, uninterested in dramatic interventions or overly ambitious ideals. At one point in the former work, in his discussion of the best way for contemporary civic leaders to appeal to the Greek political past, Plutarch even appeals directly to previous Greek practices of reconciliation.

His argument is that appeals to the victories of the Persian Wars should be restricted to exercises in rhetorical schools. In actual political rhetoric, orators should appeal, not to the military exploits of the Classical Athenians, but to their more pacific, moderate and gentle actions. These admirable Athenian precedents include the famous Athenian amnesty of 403 BC. The context makes clear that Plutarch favours the amnesty as an example of mildness, restraint, decency and tolerance. The other positive models he cites from Classical Athens include the Athenians' magnanimous celebration of the refounding of the city of Thebes, one of Athens' bitterest traditional rivals, after its destruction by Alexander; and the Athenians' expiatory sacrifice when they learnt of the civil unrest and *skytalismos* in Argos, which involved the clubbing to death of many citizens. They also showed similar sympathy and decency towards an individual by declining to search the house of a newly married man during their investigations into the Harpalus affair.⁶³ Plutarch thus here recasts Classical Greek reconciliation as a matter of decency and mildness, symbolic of the kind of mutual sympathy and humanity which, he thinks, can hold together a good polis.

This newly prominent strand in thinking about the nature of good relationships among citizens led to subtle changes in the way some Greeks conceptualised the relationship between internal civic order and interstate peace. Some Greek thinkers of these later periods reduced or downplayed the differences between the two: if civic solidarity was largely a matter of mildness, decency and humane tolerance among citizens who were not instinctively unified in patriotic fervour, then civic solidarity might now much more resemble peaceful understanding and coexistence among separate states. Indeed, it seems to have become more straightforward in these later periods to conceptualise complex, fully realised civic reconciliation of civic factions as a state similar to peace between previously warring states. Use of the word *eirene* in such contexts was still not widespread, but there are some interesting cases.

A significant example is Plutarch's account of the complex and close-knit reconciliation between Sikyonian exiles and their compatriots at home achieved by Aratus of Sikyon, with the help of Ptolemaic money, after his own return from exile in 251 BC. Plutarch describes that settlement, using traditional Greek vocabulary of reconciliation, as involving *homonoia* and *dialysis* among richer and poorer Sikyonians. However, he later takes the more distinctive step of introducing the concept of *eirene* to describe this fully developed reconciliation, much more than a mere ceasefire or accommodation between the factions: Aratus 'achieved and fitted together peace and friendship for the citizens' (κατειργάσατο καὶ συνήρμοσε φιλίαν καὶ εἰρήνην τοῖς πολίταις).⁶⁴

Plutarch thus here consciously or unconsciously reduced the gap between peace, on the one hand, and concord, friendship and reconciliation, on the other: the Sikyonian fellow citizens lived together in a state of solidarity which was simultaneously a state of peace. Plutarch was

⁶² See Ma (2000b); Roskam (2014).

⁶³ Plutarch *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 814a–c.

⁶⁴ Plutarch *Aratus* 14.

well aware of the traditional Greek parallel pairs of *polemos* and *eirene*, *stasis* and *homonoia*. He relies on this scheme in his *How a Republic should be Governed*, in his discussion of how poleis should exist within the wider world, where he distinguishes interstate conflict, now largely abated, and internal civic conflicts, which still break out. Even there, however, as in the *Aratus*, Plutarch portrays *homonoia* itself as something milder than common in much earlier Greek rhetoric. Plutarch's argument is that, in the new Greek world devoid of its traditional political and military power, in which a Roman proconsul can overrule any Greek civic magistrate, the most important remaining political role for elite Greeks in their cities is gently to coax their fellow citizens towards concord and friendship, by teaching them the folly of personal acrimony. The best life for a wise Greek citizen is now not one of ceaseless political ambition, but one of *homonoia* and 'quietness' (*hesychia*).⁶⁵

Plutarch was not alone in bringing *homonoia* closer to ideals of gentleness and even peace. The pairing of *homonoia* and *eirene* to capture a desirable, enduring state of internal civic reconciliation and solidarity, much more than a mere ceasefire, features in later Hellenistic and early Imperial political thought and rhetoric. This development occurred even though relevant authors continued, like Plutarch, to use *eirene* with overwhelming frequency to refer to interstate peace. Both the first-century BC historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the first- and second-century AD orator Dio Chrysostom used the pairing of *homonoia* and *eirene* to describe desirable states of civic reconciliation and order in past societies. In describing the aspirations of Appius Claudius Crassus to become a *decemvir* in fifth-century BC Rome, in order to introduce new laws, Dionysius portrays him as wishing to set his fellow citizens on the path of *homonoia*, *eirene* and them 'all thinking the polis to be one'. Dionysius suggests that these initial aspirations to unity and peace through enlightened law were sincere, even though Appius later came close to seeking tyranny.⁶⁶ Dio Chrysostom, for his part, suggests, in his speech refusing the office of archon, that the combination of the two states was achieved in the Greek cities of Italy, precisely during the period when the Pythagoreans were in charge of their civic affairs: for as long as the Pythagoreans were influential, those cities flourished and conducted their civic life with 'the greatest concord and peace' (τοσοῦτον χρόνον εὐδαιμονήσαντας καὶ μετὰ πλείστης ὁμονοίας καὶ εἰρήνης πολιτευσαμένους).⁶⁷ The philosophical, ethical guidance of the Pythagoreans thus ensured peaceful harmony in the politics of these cities.

Although Dionysius and Dio, like Plutarch on Sikyon, were discussing past societies, their conceptualisations of desirable, lasting civic unity as a blend of *homonoia* and *eirene* reflected ideas and concerns of the later Hellenistic and early Imperial periods themselves.⁶⁸ Dio's conception of the peaceful harmony of the Western Greek cities, based on cultural guidance and education, was not very far removed, for example, from Polybius' picture of the unity of the Arcadian poleis, based on music and collective celebrations, or from Plutarch's ideal of a moderate, educated polis of decency.

Dio himself also applied the newly prominent approach to contemporary civic politics. In his speech to the Alexandrians, when criticising their tendency to disorder during theatrical events, he accuses them of disrupting *peace* within the city: as soon as they hear music, they can no longer maintain *eirene*.⁶⁹ Jewish and Christian authors of these and following

⁶⁵ Plutarch *Praecepta rei publicae gerendae* 824c–f.

⁶⁶ Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Roman Antiquities* 10.54.7.

⁶⁷ Dio Chrysostom 49.6.

⁶⁸ Compare also Lucian *Hermotimus* 22.

⁶⁹ Dio Chrysostom 32.59–60.

centuries further developed the view of *eirene* as a crucial, rich binding force within (as well as between) communities, associated with humility, piety and fraternity, and sometimes also the peace of God himself; their approaches are explored in other chapters in this volume.⁷⁰ Augustine, for example, was to have no difficulty in talking of the ‘peace of the city’ (*pax civitatis*), itself a form of *concordia* among citizens; he lists it among the different, interrelated types of peace which bind together body, soul, household, city and heavenly city.⁷¹

A striking inscription from Sagalassos, in Pisidia in southern Asia Minor, shows this alternative approach to civic reconciliation being put into practice in the politics of a Greek city, beyond the confines of intellectual debate. This is an honorary decree of the first century BC for a certain Manesas, a citizen of Termessos, another Pisidian polis with which Sagalassos had long-term links. Manesas had played a leading role in reconciling the Sagalassians after a period of unrest. The unrest in question was probably connected with the regional repercussions of the Roman civil wars, and in particular the controversial inclusion of Pisidia in the new kingdom of Mark Antony’s appointee, the Galatian King Amyntas, in the period 39-25 BC.⁷² The decree praises Manesas as follows:

... he exceeded their enthusiasm and love of honour concerning our affairs; and he made himself most useful in private to each of our citizens who came across him, as a result of which there was univocal testimony about him by all before the council, and he conducted himself in a most good-willed way towards our public affairs; and when he recognised the recent situation, with civic strife and most harsh war enveloping our polis (φιλοτειμίας πολιτικῆς καὶ πολέμου χαλεπωτάτου περιέχοντος τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν), treating our situation as a personal setback (τὴν καθ’ ἡμᾶς περίστασιν ἴδιον ἐλάσωμα διαλαβὼν εἶναι), he showed endurance throughout the whole time, and spending time with us, urging us towards the best things (συνὼν ἡμεῖν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄριστα προτρεπόμενος), offering advice like a saviour (συμβουλευὼν σωτηρίως) and not deviating at all from hatred of evil, he was most responsible for the peace and concord among us (αἰτιώτατος τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς εἰρήνης καὶ ὁμονοίας ἐγένετο)⁷³

This decree thus praises Manesas for using his powers of persuasion to bring the Sagalassians from a state of conflict (*philotimia*) and war (*polemos*) to a state of peace (*eirene*) and concord (*homonoia*). This seems, therefore, to be a very rare case of a Greek decree about internal civic reconciliation⁷⁴ giving a prominent role to *eirene* – indeed, even presenting *eirene* as an intrinsic part of a complex, durable state of civic reconciliation, much more developed than a mere ceasefire or truce.

It might be objected that this inscription does not, in fact, celebrate internal civic *eirene*, but reproduces the traditional distinction between internal civil conflict (here called *philotimia*) and interstate *polemos*, and their respective opposites (*homonoia* and *eirene*). According to

⁷⁰ Compare, for example, Philo *De mutatione nominum* 240 on the importance of conducting social life (*politeuesthai*) with *eunomia* (good government) and *eirene*. A possible fragment of Philo (Philo fr. 30 Lewy (see Lewy (1932)) also associates *eunomia* with *homonoia* and *eirene*, even calling *homonoia* ‘the mother of *eirene*’; but the connection of this aphorism with Philo himself is difficult to prove. For later cases, compare Clement of Alexandria *Paedagogus* 3.12.101; Themistius *On the Humanity of the Emperor Theodosius* 227a Harduin.

⁷¹ Augustine *On the City of God* 19.13.

⁷² See Waelkens (2002), 316; cf. *SEG* 44.1113.

⁷³ *TAM* III 1 7, ll. 1–15.

⁷⁴ Compare Waelkens (2002), 316: the decree is a response to ‘serious internal strife’.

this view, the word *polemos* in this text would refer to the wider disturbances in Asia Minor and the broader Mediterranean associated with the Roman civil wars. However, the decree does not really support this alternative interpretation. Most importantly, Manesas' contributions to the outcome of *eirene* and *homonoia* are presented as successful interventions in guiding the Sagalassians themselves, rather than in mediating between them and external opponents: Manesas spent time among the Sagalassians coaxing and educating them, in such a way that they achieved peace and concord. The specific word order and choices also militate against the alternative interpretation, even if they do not in themselves rule it out. First, the order of the different terms does not support the alternative view: *philotimia* and *polemos* are superseded by *eirene* and *homonoia*; it would have been clearer to express the second pair as '*homonoia* and *eirene*', if *homonoia* was intended specifically to correspond to *philotimia* and *eirene* to *polemos*. Second, the *eirene* and *polemos* are explicitly said to have been achieved 'among us' (καθ' ἡμᾶς), which suggests an internal focus.

There are, therefore, striking overlaps between the rhetoric and spirit of this decree and those of the literary sources discussed above: Manesas helped to achieve an eirenic, mild kind of harmony among the Sagalassians, through gentle, non-violent advice and urging (συνὼν, προτρεπόμενος, συμβουλεύων).⁷⁵ He supposedly did so in the manner of a benevolent saviour, concerned with the welfare of all rather than particular political principles or interests. Although this example is quite isolated among inscribed rhetoric of reconciliation, there are some parallels for its general approach: for example, the foreign judge who helped to reconcile the citizens of Phalanna in the second century BC (see section 2 above) was praised for doing so 'with all humanity' (*philanthropia*).⁷⁶

Moreover, the increased ease with which Greeks could associate *eirene* with internal civic harmony and order was reflected in a widespread institutional innovation of the first century AD, richly attested for the cities of Asia Minor: the new civic magistracy of the 'eirenarch' ('magistrate of the peace'), an official charged with maintaining public order in a city's territory and arresting miscreants.⁷⁷ The eirenarch and his staff of 'pursuers' (*diogmitai*), sometimes working in tandem with another magistrate or magistrates charged specifically with supervising the countryside (*peripoloi*, *paraphylakes*), constituted something similar to a police force.⁷⁸ Although the eirenarch would have been concerned principally with external intruders and nomadic brigands, he was also charged with preventing or punishing internal unrest and disorder: eirenarchs were responsible, for example, for rounding up Christians who refused to participate in sacrifices to the emperor.⁷⁹ The office and activities of the eirenarch thus helped further to assimilate internal civic order to peace, *eirene*, of the kind which can also obtain across civic frontiers. The connection between the eirenarch's title and the ideal of peace was sometimes made explicit: for example, an eirenarch of Metropolis in Phrygia was praised for having discharged the office in a peaceful way (εἰρ[ηναρχή]σαντα εἰρη[νικῶς]).⁸⁰

It is possible to identify several plausible explanations for the underlying processes which created and sustained the new approaches to civic reconciliation, and its relationship with peace, discussed in this section. Roman influence on Greek thinking must have been a key

⁷⁵ On local elites playing this role in the Imperial period, see Brélaz (2005), 60–1.

⁷⁶ *IG* IX 2 1230, l. 5.

⁷⁷ See Brélaz (2005), 90–122; (2008), 197–204.

⁷⁸ Brélaz (2008), 168–9; cf. Chaniotis (2008) on Hellenistic forerunners.

⁷⁹ See Brélaz (2005), 103–106, with 52–6; (2008), 185–7.

⁸⁰ See Brélaz (2005), 103, discussing *MAMA* IV 130, ll. 4–5.

factor. In the course of the first century BC, with the Roman civil wars spreading out across the Mediterranean, the Romans themselves blurred their own distinction between concord (*concordia*) and peace (*pax*); H. Cornwell explores this development elsewhere in this volume. From the mid-first century BC onwards, the Romans began to conceptualise order and stability within the Roman *res publica* itself, no longer only as *concordia*, but also as *pax*. This development culminated in the Emperor Augustus' claims to have brought *pax* to Rome, and the Roman world, after civil war. This development certainly had direct Greek repercussions: a coin from Ephesus of 28 BC praises Augustus for liberating the Romans, with *Pax* on its reverse.⁸¹ The Sagalassian decree for Manesas of Termessos, discussed above, may well also directly reflect the influence of the Roman shift from *concordia* to *pax*: Manesas, almost like a benevolent Augustus, pacified the Sagalassians after internal unrest, bringing both *eirene* and *homonoia*, a form of salvation.

The new Roman ideal of *pax* extended far beyond the limits of Rome itself: the *pax Augusta*, and *pax Romana*, were soon held to cover the whole civilised world. It is easy to see how this change too would have helped to shape the developments considered in this section. If the Greek cities were now closely woven into a Mediterranean-wide fabric of Roman peace, then the distinction between inside and outside the polis began to lose much of its force.⁸² Relations of peaceful mutual tolerance and respect across the Empire could even serve as a model for local civic life.

Roman influence must, however, have acted in concert with internal Greek developments. Both the Roman and Greek changes can partly be attributed to long-term changes in Greek civic life, which some even see as processes of 'depoliticisation': the government of cities came to be considered slightly less in terms of highly political questions of justice, equality and solidarity, and correspondingly more as a question of peaceful stability and public order. As a result, civic unity came to be sometimes as much a question of non-violent coexistence as of hard-won consensus based on open, equal and strenuous debate among citizens about political matters of common concern.

This process had the effect of reinforcing the status quo, involving major inequalities of wealth and power within most Greek cities. Indeed, conceiving the existing civic order as peace helped to denude of legitimacy any attempts radically to question or overturn that status quo: dissidents were now necessarily violent rebels or even brigands, disturbers of the peace who were the legitimate focus of the eirenarch's sanctioned violence. When the province of Lycia was established, for example, the inscription celebrating the process (compare section 2 above) explicitly described the recent unrest in the region as 'brigandage': this is quite likely to have been an ideological way of discrediting popular revolt, perhaps involving calls for greater equality and attempts at redistribution.⁸³ There are also signs in the oratory of this period of attempts to stigmatise dissenters for preferring to foment internal unrest tantamount to war (*polemos*), rather than to enjoy the benefits of peace.⁸⁴

⁸¹ For the Roman developments, and their Greek impact, see Raaflaub (2007), 14, discussing the Ephesian coin (*RIC* 476). Plutarch also assimilated this changed Roman approach: see Plutarch *Caesar* 23.6 (disruption of both the *eirene* and the *homonoia* of the Roman *politeia*).

⁸² See, for example, Dio Chrysostom 40.27. For new Greek conceptions of interstate relations within a newly unified Mediterranean, compare, for example, Mack (2015), ch. 5.

⁸³ *SEG* 51.1832, a, ll. 16–24, with Thornton (2008).

⁸⁴ Compare Brélaz (2008), pp. 182–3.

From this perspective, the shift towards conceiving internal unity as something gentle and peaceful, even a form of *eirene*, was of a piece with the rise in the later Hellenistic and early Imperial period of an increasingly paternalistic civic elite in the Greek cities, which exercised sustained power over civic affairs, perhaps even something like minor kings.⁸⁵ These elite figures, such as Manesas of Termessos, were no longer always constrained by the almost automatic solidarity and spirit of equality which had come with sustained collective military engagement by the male citizenry. As a result, they could sustain an ideology which cast them as gracious defenders of peace and security⁸⁶ and of public order and welfare, who deployed decency, humanity and education to quell conflicts and unrest.

There was, therefore, a markedly elitist and anti-democratic dimension to newly prominent conceptions of civic gentleness, humanity and peace.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, these newly prominent ideas can also be interpreted less pessimistically: they did not simply flatten out Greek civic politics, but also took it in new directions, with some attractions for modern political thought and practice. The post-Classical rapprochement between *homonoia* and *eirene* in some contexts can itself be seen as yielding an attractive middle way: a more peaceable, gentle type of *homonoia*, and a more political, idealistic type of *eirene*. Indeed, it offers a historical candidate, worthy of careful consideration, for the kind of compromise between strong ethical consensus and mere pragmatic coexistence which modern liberal democratic theorists of peace have considered a highly desirable goal.⁸⁸

Moreover, the broader post-Classical Greek wider vision of civic unity as something gentle and peaceful chimes with wider modern liberal interest in adapting traditional notions of citizenship and solidarity in a more peaceful, cultural, cosmopolitan and pluralist direction. Citizenship and political values remained very important after c. 150 BC, but the good citizen was now expected to assign special importance to cultivating habits of gentleness and decency appropriate for peaceable civic life, now at least as important as martial virtue. In first-century BC Priene, for example, the elite citizen Aulus Aurelius Zosimos, a foreigner who had been granted Prienian citizenship, was praised for introducing a literary tutor for the ephebes in the gymnasium, in such a way that he led their souls towards virtue and ‘humane emotion’. Zosimos was also praised for attending to sacrifices which preserved the *homonoia* of the city of Priene, in a way which he knew would promote both individual and collective well-being. Prienian citizens thus presented themselves as united in an interdependent community of peaceable, pious, cultured *homonoia*.⁸⁹ The shifting of much political and military decision-making into Roman hands was partly a loss, but it also created the space for these new styles of citizenship.

The revised ideal of civic solidarity also brought an increased openness to outsiders from the traditional citizen-body of men of shared descent.⁹⁰ Women played a more prominent role in civic life from the later Hellenistic period onwards, though their role was still significantly limited.⁹¹ The scope for foreigners, such as Zosimos himself, to play a significant or even leading role in civic life also increased. There are also some signs of increased pluralism

⁸⁵ Compare Gauthier (1985). For recent debates about the post-Classical polis, and the role of elites, see van Nijf and Alston (2011); Mann and Scholz (2012); Martzavou and Papazarkadas (2013)

⁸⁶ Compare Chaniotis (2005), 34–5.

⁸⁷ Compare Ma (2000b).

⁸⁸ See Wendt (2013).

⁸⁹ See *I.Priene*² 68, ll. 73–6; 69, ll. 68–70.

⁹⁰ On broader cosmopolitan tendencies in the early Roman Empire: Richter (2011).

⁹¹ See van Bremen (1996).

about values, perhaps related to changing evaluations of peaceful coexistence or tolerance. Very varied gods, cults and philosophical movements thrived, side by side in the agora and beyond. In later Hellenistic Athens, for example, ephebes attended lectures at a range of different philosophical schools: Academy, Ptolemaion and Lyceum.⁹² This move may have been partly motivated by pragmatic considerations of space, with philosophers of different schools circulating between different locations,⁹³ but its celebration in honorary epigraphy brought out its symbolic pluralism and enlightenment.

The newly prominent ideals of civic order did not drive out more militaristic approaches: many Hellenistic poleis remained very active in warfare and military training,⁹⁴ and even poleis of the Imperial period which had lost active military functions and institutions retained many military symbols and values.⁹⁵ At Priene, Zosimos was praised for providing weapons for the ephebes' drills, as well as their literary tutor. Nonetheless, more open, peaceable and cosmopolitan ideals of civic order and citizenship did come to be major rivals to more exclusive, aggressive and patriotic ones in the Greek world, from the later Hellenistic period onwards. The dialectic and rivalry between the two can even be seen as fundamental to post-Classical Greek civic life.⁹⁶

5. Conclusion

The later Classical and post-Classical Greeks developed complex ideas about how to achieve civic reconciliation among fellow citizens, and the relationship between internal reconciliation and interstate peace. The dominant approach in the period discussed here was to treat internal civic reconciliation as a special state, more intense and complex than interstate peace, requiring complex measures, rituals and rhetoric. The measures and values on which Greek cities relied offer very rich case-studies relevant to modern debates: for example, ongoing debates about how to achieve a balance between amnesty, forgiveness and just punishment for past wrongs after internal conflict.

Greek approaches to reconciliation and peace in the later part of the period discussed here, especially the first centuries BC and AD, have so far been less intensively studied. Nonetheless, they enable new perspectives on contemporary debates about how to combine civic and republican ideals of national citizenship with internationalist aspirations to peace and cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the political debates and changes of that later period brought into focus the challenges and opportunities involved in pursuing a very difficult balance, or even reconciliation, between distinct political ideals: peace, peacefulness and cosmopolitan openness, on the one hand, and justice, equality, democracy, freedom and fraternity, on the other.⁹⁷

⁹² *IG II²* 1006 (122/1 BC), ll. 19–20.

⁹³ Compare Haake (2007), 44–55.

⁹⁴ See Ma (2000a); Chaniotis (2005), esp. ch. 2. For striking new later Hellenistic evidence, see *I. Metropolis* 1 (an honorary decree recording the workings of the local citizen militia).

⁹⁵ Compare Brélaz (2008), 157–8.

⁹⁶ Compare Ma (2008) on the intrinsic paradoxes of the post-Classical polis.

⁹⁷ The tensions between peace and other attractive political values in antiquity were a focus of A. Momigliano's research early in his British exile, including his lectures on 'Peace and Liberty in the Ancient World': Murray (2010).

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